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MAINE HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Sebastien Racle and Norridgewock, 1724:
The Eckstorm Conspiracy Thesis
Reconsidered
by
Kenneth M. Morrison

In 1934, Fannie Hardy Eckstorm of Brewer, Maine, a
life-long friend and student of the Abnaki Indians, pub
lished an article examining the controversial issues sur
rounding the life and death of the Jesuit Sebastien Racle
who served the Norridgewock Abnaki from 1694 until
his death in August, 1724.1 While Eckstorm accepted the
major features of the English view of Racle, she added
elements to this interpretation which seem to make her
case unassailable. The English, with a few notable excep
tions, have argued that Racle was a French political
agent who coerced the Abnaki into taking up arms
against innocent English settlers. According to this view
Racle was motivated by his hatred of the Puritan heretics
and wished only for the concrete establishment of
French political and religious hegemony in North Amer
ica. Many of the surviving documents—angry letters
from Racle to the English governors and dispatches from
the French governor to Racle—superficially support this
interpretation. Eckstorm added two considerations to
this argument which seem to prove conclusively her case
against Racle and which absolve the English of respon

sibility for the disastrous Indian war of 1722-1727. Eckstorm discovered that a significant minority of the Norridgewocks bitterly opposed Racle. She further contends
that Racle’s letters, published posthumously in the
Lettres Edificantes and now readily available in the
Jesuit Relations, were fabrications drafted by French au
thorities to hide their embarrassment at the loss of Nor
ridgewock and to minimize awareness at the French
court of Massachusetts’ threat to New France’s southern
borders. A critical evaluation of Eckstorm’s argument
shows that while she added important facets to the Racle
story, her interpretation is, in the main, untenable and
not in accord with available documentary evidence.2
Despite an imposing array of primary sources, Eck
storm’s article is not solidly based on the actual issues
which divided the Abnaki and the English between 1688
and 1727. When King William’s War erupted in 1689, the
English hastily, and mistakenly, ascribed the strong Ab
naki offensive to the interference and machinations of
the French among them. Massachusetts could not then,
and in fact never did, examine her own impact on the
Abnaki. The French provided a too convenient Machia
vellian symbol to explain the intransigence of Abnaki be
havior, and Massachusetts’ interest in Indian affairs never
rose above the level of pragmatic politics. In time, Sebastien Racle’s imposing presence on the Kennebec River
led the English to conclude that he, and not their
short-sighted and arrogant treatment of the Indians, was
the cause of all their difficulties. Amazingly, this simplis
tic argument has endured for two hundred and fifty
years, reaching its culmination in Eckstorm’s closely ar
gued article.
Sebastien Racle’s residence among the Abnaki before
the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 has attracted little attention
and engendered no controversy. Yet it was during these
years that the conflict between New England and New
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France raged most intensely. Racle’s political role should
be most clearly evident during this period if the Eckstorm argument carries any weight. Racle laid the basis
of his missionary endeavours in these years and learned
about Massachusetts’ threat both to his mission and to
Abnaki tribal integrity. Most importantly, Racle learned
that the administration of New France understood little
about Abnaki tribal issues.
When Racle arrived on the Kennebec in 1694, the war
between France and England had created a politically
charged situation beyond his control. Though the Abnaki
were clearly alienated by the English, their position be
tween New England and New France made their in
volvement in the Imperial wars inevitable. Racle was
sent to the Kennebec to assist Father Vincent Bigot. By
the end of the decade he was recalled because he dis
agreed with Bigot who favored Abnaki-English confer
ences.3 Racle s absence was short-lived. In 1701 the two
Bigot brothers were summarily recalled when Brouillan,
the Governor of Acadia, accused them of acting against
French interests among the Abnaki.4 Racle returned to
the Kennebec but his reassignment does not indicate any
anti-English hostility on his part. Racle’s later actions sug
gest that he avoided any slavish response to French po
litical designs and that he carefully weighted alternatives
before commiting himself to any policy vis a vis Massa
chusetts.
In addressing Eckstorm’s view of Racle, it is necessary
to consider the seeming contradictions in the sources
about Racle’s political activities during Queen Anne’s
War. In 1702, just before the war, Massachusetts at
tempted to win the Abnakis’ neutrality. According to
Racle, Governor Dudley pleaded with him not to “influ
ence your Indians to make war upon us.” Racle suavely
replied: “My Religion and my office as Priest were a se
curity that I would give them only exhortations to
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peace/’5 Racle seemingly accepted Abnaki neutrality.
Soon after the Abnaki became actively engaged in the
war and Racle hurriedly assured Governor Vaudreuil
that “the Abnakis would take up the hatchet whenever
he pleased.”6 The contradiction between Racle’s reply to
Dudley and his words to Vaudreuil is more apparent
than real. Racle did not lie to Dudley. His mission was
endangered by the French ministry and Governor
Vaudreuil who hoped to manipulate the Abnaki for their
own benefit. The Jesuit disagreed with this policy and,
in the process, was nearly recalled in disgrace by the
irate French authorities.
Racle did not accept the inevitability of the war as
quickly as his words suggest. In 1702 Governor Brouillan,
referring to the Indians’ meeting with Dudley, reported
to the Minister of Marine that the Abnaki had concluded
a treaty of neutrality with the English, and he accused
Racle of being responsible for the Indians’ capitulation.7
Pontchartrain, the Minister of Marine, reacted vigorous
ly: “I was very much surprised,” he wrote to the Jesuit
Superior, “to learn that one of your fathers was mixed
up in such a business, and I believe that you will judge it
proper to withdraw him from there . . . .” Pontchar
train preferred, he said, “some one who knows better
how to manage the interests of religion and those of the
King, which are inseparable.”8
The Minister soon decided that Abnaki neutrality
would not harm French interests, yet he still declared
that “His Majesty considered it wrong [mauvais] that
their missionaries interferred on the side of this neutral
ity; and I have written in his name to Father De la
Chaize to have Father Ralle [sic] recalled [retired] and
to send another priest in his place.”9
Sebastien Racle was not removed. Before the Minis
ter’s orders reached Canada, the political situation
changed completely. After a conference between the
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English and the Abnaki in June, 1703, some Englishmen
wantonly sacked the home of St. Castin on the Penob
scot, which the Indians considered an attack on them
selves. Governor Vaudreuil quickly took advantage of
the misconceived English attack for he believed that "the
English and the Abenakis must be kept irreconciliable
enemies.”10 Vaudreuil sent French officers to the Abnaki
and together they raided Casco and Wells in August,
1703.
Sebastien Racle was not responsible for the outbreak
of hostilities. He did not agree with Vaudreuil. Only af
ter the attack on Casco did Racle absolve himself of any
pro-English stigma, assuring Vaudreuil that the “Abnakis
would take up the hatchet whenever he pleased.” Racle
realized the drastic consequences the war would have
and he worked assiduously to minimize the effect of
Vaudreuil’s war policy on the Abnaki. The other mission
aries, Fathers Gaulin and Aubry, "met at Norridgewock
and told the Indians that they must look for some other
country, for that it was impossible for them to live
there.”11 With Racle’s support the two priests advised
Vaudreuil to move the Abnaki to Canada. Without Eng
lish arms and ammunition, starvation would devastate
the tribe as English guns could not. Racle ministered to
the Norridgewocks at the new Canadian mission called
St. Xavier for the duration of the war.12
The Abnakis’ retreat to Canada dramatically under
lines the peculiar problems of the Jesuit missions in
Maine. The location of the Abnaki villages, especially
Norridgewock, required the Indians to seek material as
sistance from the English rather than the French. In war
time the Abnaki depended solely on the French and the
Jesuits’ problems were simplified. In time of conflict, the
French governor directed the Abnaki through his of
ficers. In peacetime, the Jesuits coped with the complica
tions of English-Abnaki relations alone. The Jesuits, and
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particularly Sebastien Racle, became the single factor
providing stability in the policy formation of the turbu
lent post-war years. They directed Vaudreuil’s fumbling
efforts to comprehend the importance of the Abnakis*
independence for the welfare of New France.Tempered
in war, Sebastien Racle’s mettle would be tested by
peace.
The Treaty of Utrecht, ending Queen Anne’s War, was
a serious blow to French interests among the Abnaki. By
leaving the issue of Abnaki intelligence unsettled, the
treaty contributed to the eventual conflict which en
gulfed that tribe and Sebastien Racle. The French lost all
of Acadia to Great Britain—though its boundaries were
never settled13—and Massachusetts responded to her In
dian problem with confident fervor. Governor Dudley
declared that the Abnaki would not be pacified “untill
some English settlements be established ... to govern
them, and their priests be kept from them . . . ”14 This
dual policy caused the explosive confrontation between
the Abnaki and the English. These are the very issues
which Eckstorm ignores.
Eckstorm completely misconstrues French policy to
ward the Abnaki after Utrecht. Vaudreuil did not intend,
as she asserts, “to stir up Indian war with the English in
time of peace
”15 Racle actually welcomed peace
and opened negotiations with Colonel Moody to halt the
bloodshed.16 The French authorities knew that the terms
of Utrecht threatened New France but their initial re
sponse was to transfer the Abnaki to their new strong
hold on Cape Breton. Vaudreuil obviously did not under
stand the Abnaki and Father LaChasse, then missionary
to the Penobscots, told him that he “must be ignorant of
the extreme attachment that these Indians bear their
country . . . .”17 The Jesuits did not hesitate to disagree
with either Vaudreuil or the Minister of Marine when the
Abnakis’ interests were at stake. Similarly, the priests in
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sisted on maintaining the Abnaki in Maine not to spite
the English but, as time went on, in spite of the in
creasingly abrasive behavior and demands of Massachu
setts.
Fannie Hardy Eckstorm thought that “the more desper
ately the priests worked for France, the more firmly did
their own Indians oppose them.’’18 While she correctly
emphasizes the growing internal conflict among the Norridgewocks, her conclusions about its causes and French
responsibility must be considerably altered. A misdated
document led her to believe that the Norridgewocks
were seriously opposed to Racle as early as 1718,19 and
the identification of the pro-English Indians is more com
plex than she supposed. Eckstorm does not make the dis
tinction between Norridgewock and the other Abnaki vil
lages and she does not identify Indians hostile to Racle
at Norridgewock. The evidence indicates that the Penob
scot and St. John Indians were most seriously pro-Eng
lish,20 and though there were certainly pro-English In
dians at Norridgewock, their strength in 1717-1718 was
unimportant.

The English documents, on which Eckstorm heavily re
lies, ignore the distinction between the words of indi
vidual, anglophone Indians and the expressed intention
of the entire tribe. On one occasion Captain Westbrook
showed the Indians a letter from Racle to Governor
Shute. The Indians listened attentively and then declared
that “the Jesuit Lied, and he was very wicked.”21 Eck
storm accepted uncritically this incident and asserted
that the Norridgewocks “had come to distrust their
priests and said openly that they lied.”22 There is no indi
cation, however, that these Indians were from Norridge
wock. Eckstorm clearly violates her evidence in any case
by crediting the words of a few unidentified Indians
over the unmistakable opposition expressed by the Nor
ridgewocks at every conference with Massachusetts. The
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establishment of Racle’s unpopularity among the Norridgewocks is more difficult than Eckstorm would have
us believe.
Much of the conflict among the Norridgewocks, and
the opposition to Racle, was produced by individual
sachem’s efforts to curry favor with the English in evi
dent disregard to their larger tribal responsiblities. The
English, and Eckstorm, blithely ignored this aspect of
the confrontation. Massachusetts carefully cultivated the
good will of the sachems whenever possible. Some
sachems, like Bomazeen who was “very inclinable” to
the English, received special treatment which provoked
tribal squabbles and jealousy.25 Norridgewock divisive
ness during this period is not solely attributable to Sebastien Racle.
The issue which divided the Abnaki came to the fore
at the Arrowsic conference in August, 1717, and had no
thing to do with French political ambitions against New
England. Governor Shute insisted on English claims to
Abnaki lands with such intransigence that some of the
Norridgewocks feared the possibility of war.24 Faced
with Massachusetts’ refusal to compromise on the legal
ity of her land deeds, the Norridgewock sachems skirted
the main issue. “Without talking at this time about lines
and limits, we declare ourselves willing,” the Abnaki
said, “that the English should settle and occupy, where
their fathers did, though we very much dislike their
forts.”25 The Norridgewocks did not repudiate their
claim of unalienated title to the lower Kennebec or their
contention that the English might not expand further
than where they had settled in the seventeenth century.
The Norridgewocks merely deferred comment until a
later time.
English expansion alone divided the Abnaki at the
Arrowsic conference. Sebastien Racle and the English
viewed the land issue differently and Racle led the Ab-
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naki to believe that they could rely upon French aid to
maintain their title to the Kennebec. Racle angrily threat
ened Governor Shute with the inevitability of French
aid.26 Grants from the French King for the Indians’ sup
port, in addition to the construction of a chapel at Nor
ridgewock with French funds, reinforced this impression
on the Indians. Racle encouraged Abnaki antipathy to
the English settlements but he behaved openly; he would
not have advised the English of his intentions had he
been a French agent. Racle did not invent Norridgewock
irritation with Massachusetts. Even the Penobscots and
the St. John Indians rebuffed English agents when they
suggested that they acknowledge the British king.27
Those Indians also made it clear that English settlements
would not be tolerated.
Racle was not primarily concerned with French stra
tegic interests in Acadia. He did not incite the Abnaki
against the English. Rather, he encouraged them to kill
English cattle in an effort to halt the settlements. When
Governor Shute assured the Council of Trade as early as
1718 that he could “prevent a war breaking out/’28 Sebas
tien Racle was pressing only for a boundary settlement.
Racle warned Governor Vaudreuil that Abnaki-English
antagonisms could be solved only by the prompt settle
ment of the boundary between New England and New
France. He urged Vaudreuil to convince the Minister of
Marine of the issue’s importance.29 The Council of
Marine, rather than Racle, immediately saw the situation
in the pragmatic terms of imperial policy and contended
that “the English pretensions are exorbitant.”30 Support
for the Norridgewocks was not forthcoming, however.
Vaudreuil was cautioned to do nothing to jeopardize
France’s alliance with Great Britain.31
Without any consensus among the French authorities
about the confrontation, the Abnaki and Sebastien Racle
were severely tested between 1719 and 1721. During this
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period, and not earlier as Eckstorm supposes, the Norridgewocks’ initial anti-English resolve partially col
lapsed. Racle remained highly irritated by the Rev. Jo
seph Baxter’s feeble efforts to Calvinize his Catholic con
verts. The pressure of settlement did not subside and the
clandestine liquor traffic flourished unabated. “There is
no Justice amongst the English,” Racle asserted. 32
The English refused to consider the impact of their
policy because Sebastien Racle conveniently explained
for them the Abnakis’ refusal to acquiese to their terms.
When the Norridgewocks demurred again to admit the
validity of English land deeds to the Kennebec in 1720,
the English commissioners quickly ascribed their testi
ness to the “Cunning Insinuations of that Incendiary the
Priest.”33 Eckstorm overlooks this aspect of the story.
She might well have asked why the English found
Racle’s advice to his Indians “Cunning Insinuations,” but
their inquiry points away from her conspiracy thesis.
When the English offered—through the ever-faithful
Bomazeen—to send some Abnaki to Great Britain, Racle
exploded. He curtly declared that if any of the Norridge
wocks accepted he would “drive them forever from the
Church.” This “railing letter,”34 as the English put it,
minced no words. “Any treaty,” Racle insisted,
particularly that of Arrowsic is Null, if I don’t ap
prove it, though the Indians have consented, for I bring
them so many reasons against it that they absolutely con
demn what they have done.” Racle was especially an
gered by Englishmen covertly seeking information about
him from his Indians. “They inquire about my words: do
they intend to unite against me to drive me from my mis
sion,” he demanded. Racle added that “W hatever you
think you can’t move me.” The Jesuit closed with a frank
declaration of intent by warning the English to recall
their settlers, “for assuredly,” he promised, “there shall
not one remain there.”35
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The Norridgewocks continued only to kill English
cattle despite these threats. Massachusetts made plans for
an Indian conference to demand satisfaction for dam
ages as well as hostages guaranteeing the future peaceful
conduct of the Indians. Significantly a minority of the
Executive Council held that it was not “just for this
Govemmt. to encourage private persons to settle”36 on
the Kennebec. The House of Representatives neverthe
less resolved to send 250 men to Norridgewock to arrest
Sebastien Racle.37
The conference opened first on November 25, 1720,
with the Indians requesting that “the English people may
be removed from Merry Meeting” Bay. As usual the com
missioners refused to consider the Indians’ point of view
and they insisted: “What security will you give us for
your good conduct . . . for we will take your words no
longer,” Overwhelmed, the Indians enquired: “How
many skins are we to pay . .
Arguing to the last,
these essentially pro-English Indians agreed to deliver
200 skins and to surrender four sachems within twen
ty-five days. When the English wished, at the end of the
conference, to discuss the settlements, the Indians merely
replied: “We have said all yt we were ordered to say.”38
Much to Racle’s disgust, the hostages were presented to
the Executive Council on January 13, 1721.39
Equally divisive for the Norridgewocks was Governor
Vaudreuil’s refusal to aid them with French soldiers as
Racle had promised. The King and Minister wished to
halt English expansion on the Kennebec but they refused
Vaudreuil permission to actively help them. When Vau
dreuil temporized, the Norridgewock sachems at Quebec
retorted with an ironical laugh—Know, that we all who inhabit this
vast continent will, whensoever we please, as long as we exist, unite
to expel all foreigners from it, be they who they may.40

The Norridgewocks were hopelessly divided by both
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the French and the English in 1720-1721 and Sebastien
Racle moved to strengthen their resolution. Racle’s life
was in danger from his own Indians, as Eckstorm notes,
41 but their hatred came from Vaudreuil’s failure to give
them the support Racle had promised and not because
the Jesuit worked desperately for French interests.
Racle began to undermine the pro-English Norridge
wocks because he knew that the English had ordered
them to abandon him.42 When Massachusetts set a date
to hear the Abnaki response on his dismissal, Racle de
cided to pack the conference. He invited the Canadian
Abnaki of St. Francis and Becancourt to join the Nor
ridgewocks and, at his suggestion, Vaudreuil hurried to
insure their compliance.43 “I think you will find,” Inten
dant Begon assured Racle, that the governor’s speech to
those Indians was in “the Sense proposed by you.”44
Though Vaudreuil and Begon realized that only Racle’s
gamble could recoup the loss of French prestige at Nor
ridgewock, the priest’s determination frightened them. In
tendant Begon warned Racle three times about the “pru
dence with which we Deem ourselves obliged To Act to
ward the English, so that we may not Commit our
selves.”45 Vaudreuil and Begon feared that Racle would
not keep French interests in mind while confronting
Massachusetts and they sent the Jesuit Superior, Father
LaChasse, to the Kennebec to observe the proceedings.
On July 28, 1721, the two Jesuits and Castine the young
er, marched into Brunswick at the head of 200 Indians
and openly defied the English. The confrontation
panicked Massachusetts. The Indians refused to compro
mise further, demanded that the English abandon their
settlements, and that the hostages be returned.46 Massa
chusetts could not compromise with these demands and
within a year war was a reality between the Abnaki and
the Bay Colony.47
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Eckstorm does not treat the escalation of this conflict
and, more seriously, her interpretation of the English at
tack on Norridgewock overlooks inconsistencies in the
English sources and exaggerates the French response to
the attack. The French authorities had nothing to hide
from the Ministry of Marine; Eckstorm only supposes
that they were embarrassed by the loss of Norridgewock.
Historians have divided into two camps on the issue of
the English attack on Norridgewock on August 23, 1724.
The English follow the sworn reports of the at
tackers—actually the testimony of Captain Harmon.
Most writers supplement Harmon’s two accounts with
Thomas Hutchinson’s History of Massachusetts-Bay
which critically examines Captain Mouton’s version of
the attack as well. The French view rests with three
men, Governor Vaudreuil, and Fathers LaChasse and
Charlevoix, who in turn follow the surviving Norridgewocks. Eckstorm modifies these two, older views.
Eckstorm reports that Racle was forewarned that the
English were on their way to Norridgewock. While she
attributes the warning to the prophetic mutterings of an
Indian shaman, or medicine man, Racle’s last letter writ
ten on the afternoon of his death suggests otherwise.48
Returning from their latest expedition, some Indians re
ported that 200 men were coming to “drive them out of
their camp .
” Racle thought that the possibility was
remote:
But I said to them, how could that be, seeing we are daily surround
ing and making inroads upon them
Besides, in all the war you
have had with them, did you ever see them come to attack you in the
spring, summer, or in the fall, when they knew you were in the
woods.49

Racle’s statement was correct; the English always avoid
ed campaigns in the summer when the troops were
susceptible to disease.50
Eckstorm’s claim that Racle “need not have lost the
88

mission if he had taken a warning given him in ample
time/’51 is a serious error. Sebastien Racle neither ridi
culed the Indians’ fear of an invasion nor convinced
them to stay at Norridgewock. The old priest told Fath
er LaChasse that the Indians
Hearken to all my reasons aforegoing, but follow their own. They de
sign to quit the village for a fortnight, and to go five or six leagues up
the river, they proposed it to me, and I have given my consent

The Indians retreat from their village was only hours too
late.
When their neared Norridgewock around noon of Au
gust 23, the English decided to divide their forces. Cap
tain Harmon, the commander-in-chief for the expedition,
oddly preferred to scout the corn fields, leaving the task,
responsibility, but not the credit to Captain Moulton.53
The commander by default proceeded directly to the vil
lage. At this point the ensuing attack becomes obscure.
Moulton’s account, as given by Hutchinson, contradicts
one of Harmon’s two accounts in the Boston newspapers.
At question in this conflict of English sources is the prob
lem of the stockade, despite the fact that Eckstorm confi
dently asserted its existence.
Both Governor Vaudreuil and Father LaChasse re
ported that the village was not enclosed,54 though there
is still extant a map drawn by Joseph Heath in 1719 de
scribing Norridgewock as a fort “Built with Round
Loggs nine foot long one end set into the
Ground . . ”55 Interestingly, Harmon’s accounts in the
Boston papers and Hutchinson are silent about the stock
ade. Eckstorm states that the New England Courant men
tions the east gate. The newspaper actually said, less sub
stantially, that the plan of the offense was to place the
troops so that the Indians “could in no way avoid them
by running into the River.”56 Certainly a stockade was
not essential to, and probably would hamper, that strategem.
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Even the other English version does not solve the prob
lem. According to Harmon’s second story, action ensued
after their “approach within Pistol Shot” of the town.57
But Hutchinson says that the village
about 3 o’clock suddenly opened upon them. There was not an Indian
to be seen, being all in their wigwams. Our men were ordered to ad
vance softly and to keep a profound silence. At length, an Indian
came out of one of the wigwams and, as he was making water,
looked round him and discovered the English close upon him. He im
mediately gave the war whoop and ran in for his gun. The whole vil
lage
took the alarm, and the warriors ran to meet the English,
the rest fled to save their lives.58

Though the two accounts differ, neither makes provision
for the stockade. It seems that the Indians would have
had time to close the gates. It cannot be proven that the
gate was left open so that Racle could flee to safety. Eck
storm only supposed that his house was outside the enclo
sure as it was at Penobscot; there is no evidence of that
and Heath’s map does not mention it. Even if we accept
Moulton’s account we cannot establish the stockade’s exis
tence. Eckstorm emphasizes the issue because she be
lieved that Vaudreuil and LaChasse had much to hide in
the loss of the most important Abnaki village. But they
had not evaded the loss of Penobscot though it was as
important as Norridgewock.59 Nor did they hide the fact
that many Abnaki fled to Canada at the beginning of the
war. In any case, the French Ministry could not hold
Vaudreuil responsible for a defeat in which their denial
of aid played so vital a part.
The French accounts of the attack are clearly no fabri
cations. Father LaChasse reported what he heard from
the Indians though he did so with pious embellishment.
There was real need of inspiring support in France for
the sorely beleaguered Abnaki nation; in 1726 there was
little interest in the Jesuit missions of Canada. Jesuits
were not in vogue at court and the Superior-General’s
pleas for the Abnaki had fallen on deaf ears since 1713.
90

Racle’s death gave LaChasse an issue to fire French
popular imagination. He did not invent a myth about
Racle’s death. lie had known, admired and loved Racle
since his arrival in New France and the two priests had
been comrades in diplomatic endeavours for the Abnaki.
LaChasse’s eulogy was not intended to be a dispassion
ate review of the ease.00
Governor Vaudreuil, in his official dispatch, did not
romanticize the attack as did LaChasse. The governor de
scribed the sudden attack without exaggeration.01 The In
dians who survived the first volley tried to hold the Eng
lish while the women and children raced for the river.
Without dramatic effect, Vaudreuil described Racle rush
ing from his house only to be immediately cut down by
an English volley.02 It is this account from the surviving
Norridgewocks that has inspired the popular “martyr”
myth of Racle’s death. Eckstorm reacted not only to in
consistencies in the French sources but also to their un
critical acceptance.03
Vaudreuil’s account is not surprising. When the Indians
returned on the following day, they found Racle’s body
with the dead chieftains heaped in the center of the vil
lage', and hence', the' steiry e>f the priest’s hereric death.01
The Indians elid not witness Racle’s armed defense' and
they did ne>t see' Lieutenant Jaepies shoot him. Eckstorm
thought it improbable that there' were any remains left
to be* nmurneel because' the' village' was burned by the re
treating force's.05 The' English slept in the village,how
ever, and with 128 men to bivouac, it is likely that the}’
nmveel all the' be>elies from the' cabins into the' center of
the' village. The' returning Indians understandable' con
cluded that Rack' died surrounded by the' village sa
chems.

In retrospect it seems incredible' that Racle’s death has
aroused such intensity of feeling. Admirers and detraeteas alike' agree' that he was an extraeadiiuuy man.
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Shrouds of infamy and sanctity have been thrown upon
him though either claim is extreme. It is preposterous to
claim that he was motivated by an inveterate hatred of
the English. It is equally absurd to lay at his feet the bur
den of war guilt. The record speaks for itself. Racle en
couraged no atrocities. No Englishman was killed before
an Abnaki was. No Englishmen were abducted until, in
Abnaki eyes, four of their chieftains were. Nor were the
settlements harrassed until they had passed an explicitly
declared line, and the English were well aware of that
line.
Racle was not a French agent. His nationality was
secondary to his personal commitment to the Abnaki. He
feared, but accepted, Abnaki trade with the English. He
remained a realist though he opposed the continual Eng
lish encroachments on the Kennebec. He accepted the
existence of Brunswick, Topsham and Georgetown but
barred further expansion. He was no sly political
intriguer. He described his point of view to Governor
Shute who promptly rejected it, time and again. The
causes of the war of 1722-1727 are complex and the “vil
lain theory” along with the “martyr theory” must be dis
carded as simplistic. The very readiness of the English to
attribute Abnaki mischievousness to Racle’s influence is,
in itself, enough to discredit that view.
The wildly divergent views of Racle do not stem from
any deviousness in his actions. Rather the conflict of
interpretations has come from a polarization of the
secondary sources and a partial consideration of the
primary testimony. The English hastened to condemn
what they saw as a mad, Jesuitical plot against their fron
tier ancestors. The French were no more impartial. They
supported the martyr myth because Racle opposed the
English heretics who envied his success with the Abnaki.
In the process, Sebastien Racle emerged not as the deter
mined man he was, but as a shadow of two cultural fic
tions.
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